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I. INTRODUCTION

In the last year, the landscape of patent law was altered by court
opinions from the Supreme Court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, as well as in opinions rendered by the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences (hereafter BPAI) at the United States Patent
and Trademark Office. In addition, patent reform legislation was
introduced that could have shaken up patent practice even further.
Although none of the reform proposals were passed, revised versions of
these legislative initiatives have already been introduced in 2009. 2 This
brief write-up summarizes many (but by no means all) of the important
developments in patent law in 2008 and early 2009.
II. PATENTABILITY REQUIREMENTS
.§l.Q.l: Patent eligible subject matter rose to the forefront in 2008
with the en bane decision in In re Bilski. 3 In Bilski, the Federal Circuit
overturned the "useful, concrete, and tangible result'.4 test for business
methods and software inventions from State Street Bank and its
progeny. 5 In its place, the court set up a test that requires the invention
to be implemented by a particular machine or to involve a physical
transformation. 6 The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari and will
hear the case next term. 7 I am not hopeful that the Supreme Court will
overturn Bilski, so it is likely the practical applications and nuances of
the "machine or transformation" test will continue to play out over the
next few years. Cases from the BPAI are already addressing the issue at
an alarming rate. See for example, Ex parte Atkin, Ex parte Gutto, Ex
parte Barnes, and Ex parte Becker. 8

2. See, e.g., Patent Reform Act 2009, S. 515, !lith Cong. §35 (2009), available at
http://www.opencongress.orglbill/lll-s515/text (the latest proposed patent reform act which passed
out of the Senate Judiciary Committee April3, 2009); Fish and Richardson P.C., Fish News: 2009
Patent Reform Update, http://www.fr.com/news/articledetail.cfrn?articleid=490&gclid=CKCh6sb
gz5kCFQdN5QodzzTt5Q (last visited April 4, 2009) (for a summary of current action on these
bills).
3. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
4. /d. at 959.
5. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
6. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960.
7. Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964,2009 U.S. LEXIS 4103 (U.S. June I, 2009).
8. See, e.g., Ex pane Atkin, B.P.A.I. Appeal 2008-4352 (2009); Ex pane Gutta, B.P.A.I.
Appeal 2008-4352 (2009); Ex parte Barnes, B.P.A.I. Appeal 2007-4114 (2009); Ex parte Becker,
B.P.A.I. 2008-2064 (2009) (BPAI decisions can be quickly accessed from the e-FOIA/Patent Office
website by searching for the case name (e.g., "Ex Parte Atkin") in an internet search engine, such as
Google).
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Further, this issue is extending beyond the business method and
software realm into other fields, such as medical diagnosis. For
example, in Classen v. Biogeo, the Federal Circuit's three-sentence
opinion affirmed the district court's finding of invalidity under §101.9 In
the pending case Prometheus v. Mayo, 10 the district court found a
method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy by administering a particular
drug to a patient and then using the patient's metabolite level to adjust
future drug doses, to be ineligible subject matter. 11
As the Bilski case was the sole topic for another panel at the
Richard C. Sughrue Symposium, 12 I will leave this summary very brief,
although I believe there is much more to say on the matter. 13

A.

§102:

There is not much new on the anticipation/statutory bar front, but
one interesting case relating to § 102 this year is the Federal Circuit's
decision in SRI Int '1, Inc. v. internet Security Systems Inc., 14 where the
court addressed what may be required for a "publication" on the Internet.
Here, before the critical date, an inventor posted a paper on an FTP
server and sent an e-mail to a small group of people announcing the
presence of the paper. 15 While the district court held this activity to
constitute a "publication" for purposes of § 102, the Federal Circuit
disagreed. 16 In particular, the court noted that there was no evidence
that, in 1997, a person skilled in the art could have gained access to the
FTP server and navigated through a generic directory structure to obtain
the paper in question. 17 Further, the court found the paper had not been

9. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 25661 (Fed. Cir.
Dec. 19, 2008).
10. Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 04cv1200 JAH(RBB), 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 25062 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), appeal docketed, No. 2008-1403 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 22
2009).
II. Prometheus Labs., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25062, at *14.
12. Richard C. Sughrue Symposium on Intellectual Property Law and Policy at the University
of Akron School of Law (March 9, 2009) (other panels at the conference covered Egyptian Goddess
and Bilski in more depth, and while very important, this paper does not extensively detail them).
13. In fact, I have written on this topic even before the Bilski opinion came out. See Kristen
Osenga, Ants, Elephant Guns, and Statutory Subject Matter, 39 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1087 (2007) (my
arguments in that piece, namely that the courts and the Patent Office are using § 101 rejections as
proxies for inquiries made more appropriately under other patentability requirements, remain timely
today, and in fact are quite similar to arguments raised in some Supreme Court briefing).
14. SRI Int'l, v. Internet Sec. Sys., 511 F.3d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
15. See id. at 1190.
16. See id. at 1192.
17. Seeid. at 1197.
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catalogued or indexed in any meaningful way. 18 Judge Moore dissented,
stating that the court's previous line of cases required this in fact to be
considered a publication. 19
Another interesting case is Net Moneyin, Inc. v. Verisign, Inc. 20 In
this case, although a prior art reference disclosed all the elements of the
claim, the elements in the prior art reference were not arranged or
combined in the same way as in the claim; rather the elements were
disclosed in different embodiments. 21 The Federal Circuit reversed the
district court's finding of anticipation, holding that anticipation requires
more than simply finding each element within a single prior art
reference. 22 The invention, which must be disclosed in the anticipating
reference, must include both the claimed elements and the claimed
arrangement thereof. 23 Due to the fact that neither embodiment in the
prior art reference contained all the claimed elements in the claimed
arrangement, there was no anticipation. 24

B.

§103:

In 2008, the Federal Circuit fleshed out some of the implications of
the 2007 Supreme Court case, KSR v. Teleflex. 25 KSR heightened the
standard for non-obviousness by allowing the combination of prior art in
the absence of a "teaching, motivation, or suggestion" to combine, the
test the Federal Circuit had been using. 26 Now, after KSR, while a
"teaching, motivation, or suggestion" to combine remains viable, it is
not necessary; obviousness can be found so long as it would have been
reasonable for a person having ordinary skill in the art to combine the
pieces of prior art, such as in KSR, where previously known elements
were combined without an overall change in function or performance.27
One of the most important cases on this issue is Muniauction, Inc.
v. Thomson Corp. 28 Muniauction owned a patent directed towards
conducting municipal bond auctions over the Intemet. 29 A jury found

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See id.
See id. at 1201-02 (Moore, J., dissenting).
Net Moneyin Inc. v. Verisign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Jd at 1370.
Jd. at 1371.
See id. at 1370.
See id. at 1371.
KSR Int'1 Co. v. Te1eflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
Jd at415.
See id. at 422.
Muniauction, Inc. v. Thompson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id at 1321-22.
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Thomson liable for infringement of the patent and awarded Muniauction
$77 million. 30 Thomson appealed to the Federal Circuit, arguing the
patent was obvious, and the Federal Circuit agreed. 31 The court first
noted that the patent itself stated that internet technology and web
browsers were conventional and well-known. 32 The court then stated
that "adapting existing electronic processes to incorporate modem
internet and web browser technology was similarly commonplace" at the
time the patent application was ftled. 33 Therefore, the combination was
obvious. 34 Given this broad application of KSR, it is questionable
whether any electronic technology transformed for web-based use would
be found non-obvious. 35
Another important post-KSR case is Eisai v. Dr. Reddy's Labs. 36 In
this case, the Federal Circuit explained that KSR will often not apply in
chemical compound cases, even where the individual components of the
claimed compound are often previously known? 7 "To the extent an art
is unpredictable, as the chemical arts often are, KSR's focus on these
'identified, predictable solutions' may present a difficult hurdle because
potential solutions are less likely to be genuinely predictable". 38 Rather,
for chemical cases, the prima facie case for obviousness begins with the
identification of a lead compound in the prior art. 39 Then, obviousness
can be based on the structural similarity between the lead compound and
the claimed compound, along with some motivation that would lead a
skilled artisan to make the modification. 40 Mo6vation can be shown by
a close relationship between the prior art and the new compound that
would make the substitution predictable.41
Obviousness in biotech cases is still up in the air following Ex parte
Kubin from the BPAI. 42 In Kubin, for which the Federal Circuit heard

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

/d. at 1321.
/d. (rejecting the patent on grounds of obviousness).
See id. at 1326.
/d. at 1327.
/d.
See KSR Int'1 Co. v. Te1eflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
Esai Co. Ltd. V. Dr. Reddy's Labs., Ltd, 533 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
See id. at 1356.
/d. at 1358.
See id. at 1358.
See id. at 1357.
See id.
See, Ex Parte Kubin, B.P.A.I. Appeal No. 2007-0819 (2007).
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an oral argument in January 200943 , the BPAI found a "nucleic acid
molecule" claim obvious over the prior art. 44 Although the molecule's
structure was not similar to other regulator proteins, and although
protein folding is an unpredictable art, 45 the BPAI held the claim
obvious because the molecule in question could have been isolated and
verified using conventional techniques46 - that is, it would have been
obvious to try. 47 This argument of "obvious to try" had been previously
rejected by the Federal Circuit in In re Deuel, 48 but the BPAI held that
KSR limited Deuel and that the invention in this case was simply a
product of "ordinary skill and common sense. '.49 As this article was
going to press, the Federal Circuit decided In re Kubin and affirmed the
BPAI's opinion. 50 The Federal Circuit's opinion resurrects the 'obvious
to try' analysis, although an invention that is obvious to try is not
necessarily obvious. 51 How this plays out in the ever-advancing field of
biotechnology will be seen over the next few years.

c.

§112:

There is not much new to report with respect to enablement, best
mode, or written description. The Federal Circuit continues to hold
broad claims invalid in the absence of sufficient support, either in the
form of multiple embodiments or a single embodiment with enough
detail supporting multiple configurations. 52 See for example, In re
Alonso, which found that in an unpredictable art (here treating
neurofibrosarcomas using antibody reagents) a single embodiment is
insufficient. 53
Even in predictable electrical and mechanical arts, the Federal
Circuit is requiring the full scope to be enabled by the specification to
43. Donald Zuhn, Kubin Panel Questions Motivation Behind Reversal in New Written Description
Training Materials, PATENTDocs, Jan. 8, 2009, http://www.patentdocs.orW2009/0l/kubin-panel-questionsmotivation-behind-reversal-in-new-written-description-training-materials.htrnl.
44. See generally Ex Parte Kubin, B.P.A.I. Appeal No. 2007-0819 at *5, *7.
45. !d. at *13 (molecular biology ... generally an unpredictable art).
46. !d. at *5.
47. See Ex Parte Kubin, B.P.A.I. Appeal No. 2007-0819 at *8.
48. In re DeueL 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
49. Ex Parte Kubin, B.P.A.I. Appeal No. 2007-0819 at *9.
50. See, In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (the US Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit decided the case on April 3, 2009. The court of appeals indicated that the KSR standard for
biotechnology was not simply obviousness, but obvious to try. In making its decision, the Court
expressly overruled Deuel).
51. !d.
52. See, e.g., In re Alonso, 545 F.3d 1015, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
53. !d.
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uphold validity. 54 See for example, Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC. 55 In
this case, although the claim was broad enough to cover video games
and movies, the specification only discussed video games. 56 The
evidence showed that movies were quite different from video games,
and thus the court held the patent invalid for failure to enable the full
scope. 57
As far as claim definiteness under § 112, the court issued a couple
opinions dealing with the propriety of functional language.
In
Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., the
claims at issue included both structural and functional language. 58 In
particular, claim 1 was written as follows:
A method of executing instructions in a pipelined processor
comprising:
[structural limitations of processor];
the method further comprising:
[method steps implemented in the processor]. 59
Despite the unconventional nature of the claim,60 the Federal
Circuit explained that the claim was not indefinite and was "clearly
limited to practicing the claimed method in a pipelined processor
possessing the requisite structure."61
In Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd., v. International
Game Technology, 62 the Federal Circuit dealt a blow, however, to using
functional claim language in computer apparatus systems. 63 The claim
language at issue was "game control means,"64 which falls under §112,
para. 6, "means plus function" analysis. 65 The specification discussed
only that the means included a programmed general purpose computer. 66
The court held that this was insufficient because "general purpose
computers can be programmed to perform very different tasks in very

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
2008).
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See, e.g., Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993(Fed. Cir. 2008).
/d. at 1000.
!d. at 998.
Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., 520 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir.

/d. at 1374.
U.S. Patent No. 5,471,593 (filed Jan. 21, 1994).
Microprocessor Enhancement Corp., 520 F.3d at 1375.
Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int'l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
!d.
!d. at 1335.
35 u.s.c. § 112 (1975).
Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd., 521 F.3d at 1328-33.
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different ways," so "simply disclosing a computer as the structure
designated to perform a particular function" does not provide
appropriate limits on the patent's scope and is thus invalid. 67
Ill. PATENT PROSECUTION ISSUES

No discussion of 2008 would be complete without a mention of
Tafas v. Dudai8 (now captioned Tafas v. Doff\ the enormous battle
over whether the Patent Office has the power to implement substantive
prosecution rules with respect to continuation applications and
limitations on the number of claims. 70 Tafas complained that the Patent
Office had exceeded the rule-making authority it had been delegated by
Congress. 71 After imposing an injunction to keep the Patent Office from
implementing the new rules, the District Court found the rules to be
substantive in nature and thus outside the scope of the Patent Office's
power. 72 The Patent Office appealed to the Federal Circuit and
arguments were held in December 2008. 73 It is unclear to what extent, if
at all, the new administration will pursue this case.

A.

Patent Enforcement Issues: Venue & Jurisdiction

This year may have marked the end of the Eastern District of
Texas's reign as the hotbed of patent infringement cases. The Fifth
Circuit, in In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., 14 held that the judges in
the Eastern District of Texas must follow the federal change of venue
statute, 28 U.S.C. §1404, when deciding motions to transfer cases. 75 In
particular, the district courts should no longer allow the plaintiff's choice
of forum to trump all other considerations, such as the location of
witnesses and other matters of convenience. 76
On this issue, the Federal Circuit follows the law of the circuit in
which the district court resides and has adopted the same viewpoint as
the Volkswagen court. In TS Tech USA Corp., the Federal Circuit

67. !d. at 1333.
68. Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va. 2008).
69. Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
70. Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va. 2008).
71. !d. at 811.
72. !d. at 814.
73. Audio of Oral Argument, Tafas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (No. 2008-1352) available at
http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/mp3/2008-1352.mp3.
74. In re Volkswagon of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008).
75. !d. at 326.
76. !d. at 315.
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responded to a petition for writ of mandamus by ordering a patent case
transferred out of the Eastern District of Texas. 77 The Federal Circuit
found that while Texas was a proper venue, Ohio was a far more
appropriate venue, given the facts that the defendant company was
headquartered in Ohio; the witnesses were located in Ohio, Michigan,
and Canada; the physical evidence was in Ohio; and the state of Texas
had no connection or interest in the case. 78
Between Volkswagen and TS Tech, patent infringement cases are
starting to be transferred out of the Eastern District of Texas. Just
recently, Judge Love of the Eastern District of Texas granted a motion to
transfer in the case of Odom v. Microsoft, 79 where the plaintiff was
located in Oregon, the defendant was located in Washington, the conduct
and contracts giving rise to the case occurred in the Pacific Northwest,
and Texas had no particular interest in the case. 80
B.

Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction:

In the Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. 81 case from 2007, the
Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit's previous test for
declaratory judgment (OJ) jurisdiction, namely that the OJ plaintiff has
(1) a reasonable apprehension of suit and (2) has conducted meaningful
preparation towards infringing activity. 82 While Medimmune got rid of
the first prong of the test, it apparently left the second prong intact. 83
This year, the Federal Circuit has given us a broader test for DJ
jurisdiction in Cat Tech LLC v. Tubemaster, Inc. 84 The proper inquiry
now is whether the totality of the circumstances shows there is a
substantial controversy between parties having adverse interests of
sufficient reality and immediacy to require DJ. 85 Meaningful
preparation is important, but not required, to show immediacy and
reality. 86

77.
78.
79.
Tex. Jan.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See In re TS Tech. USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
!d. at 1320-23.
Odom v. Microsoft Corp., No. 6:08-CV-331, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9835, at *2 (E.D.
30, 2009).
Odom, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9835, at* 22-23.
See generally Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
!d. at 132.
See generally Medlmmune Inc., 549 U.S. at 129-37.
Cat Tech LLC v. Tubemaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
!d. at 879 (quoting Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007)).

!d.
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Jurisdiction over Foreign Patentees:

In Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten International Co., Ltd., the
Federal Circuit held that a district court lacked jurisdiction over a
foreign patentee in a declaratory judgment action. 87 For specific
jurisdiction to attach in DJ cases, a court must determine whether the
claim arises out of or relates to the DJ defendant's contacts with the
forum state. 88 The Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that a threat letter
alone is insufficient to create DJ jurisdiction and that there must be other
activities related to the claim in the forum. 89 Here, the DJ plaintiff
asserted there was jurisdiction based on an infringement letter mailed
from Aten (a Taiwanese corporation) to Avocent (in Alabama);
distribution of Aten products in Alabama by a subsidiary; and previous
patent enforcement litigation by Aten in other fora. 90 The Federal
Circuit held that the previous patent enforcement was not relevant to this
case or fora and that the distribution of a product by the patentee was not
related to the DJ claim that the patent at issue was invalid and not
infringed by Avocent.91 Thus, there was no personal jurisdiction over
Aten. 92
N. PATENT ENFORCEMENT ISSUES: INFRINGEMENT

A.

Design Patent Infringement:

The Federal Circuit altered the analysis for finding infringement of
design patents in its en bane decision in Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa,
Inc. 93 This case, like Bilski, was the subject of another panel at the
Richard C. Sughrue Symposium and therefore is not covered extensively
in this paper. 94 Simply noted, the court abolished the "point of novelty"
prong of the infringement inquiry for design patents. 95

87. Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int'l Co., Ltd., 552 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
88. See, e.g., Breckenridge Pharm. Inc. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 444 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed.
Cir. 2006).
89. Silent Drive, Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc., 326 F.3d 1194 (Fed.Cir.2006) (quoting Red Wing
Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1359-60 (Fed.Cir.l998)).
90. Id. at 1341.
91. /d. at 1339-41.
92. /d. at 1340.
93. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en bane).
94. Richard C. Sughrue Symposium on Intellectual Property Law and Policy at the University
of Akron School of Law (March 9, 2009) (other panels at the conference covered Egyptian Goddess
and Bilski in more depth, and while very important, this paper does not extensively detail them).
95. Egyptian Goddess, Inc., 543 F.3d at 683.
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Joint Infringement:
In Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp.,

96

the Federal Circuit also
addressed the issue of infringement of a process patent, where all of the
steps are not performed by the same party. 97 In that case, the auction
process included the steps of inputting data associated with a bid,
automatically computing interest based on the inputted data, submitting
the bid by transferring over an electronic network, and communicating a
message associated with the bid, where at least one step is performed
using a web browser. 98 The problem is that the first step, inputting a bid,
is done by a user of the system, while the rest of the steps are performed
by the defendant (Thomson), who provides the software and access to
the electronic network. 99 The Federal Circuit held that there was no
infringement because there was no one party that performed every step
of the claimed process. 100 A petition for writ of certiorari in this case
was denied by the Supreme Court on March 9, 2009. 101
C.

Transnational Infringement:

Although patent law is generally limited to activity that occurs in
the United States, Congress has expanded the reach via §271(f), which
prohibits supplying components of a patented device to be assembled
abroad, 102 and §271(g), which prohibits importation of products made
abroad using patented processes. 103 While the Federal Circuit had ruled
in 2005 (in the Union Carbide v. Shell case) 104 that §271(f) extends to
components used in a claim method, this holding was made tenuous by
the Supreme Court's decision in 2007 in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T
Corp., 105 which held that the shipment of golden master disks,
containing patented processes in the form of software that were used for
duplication abroad, did not fall under §271(f)'s purview. 106 However,
this year, the Federal Circuit stated that the Supreme Court decision did
See Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1325-27 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
See Id at 1330.
See ld at 1322-23.
See ld at 1329.
See Id at 1330.
101. Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Ct. 1585 (2009).
102. 35 u.s.c. §27l(f) (1984).
103. 35 u.s.c. §27l(g) (1994).
104. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
105. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007).
106. Id at 462.
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not alter the §271(t) analysis with respect to supplying actual
components used in patented processes (versus the golden master disks,
which were copied onto the computer systems, and not themselves
actually used). 107 The defendant sought rehearing en bane to overturn
Union Carbide, 108 and the petition was supported by some big-name
amici, such as AIPLA 109 and a group of tech companies including
Microsoft, Intel, and Oracle. 110 The en bane rehearing was granted111 ,
and argument held May 29,2009, at the Federal Circuit. 112

D.

Claim Construction:

Although there has been no big news in claim construction
jurisprudence this year, there have been many cases that point out the
still-remaining need for something better. For example, Outside the Box
Innovations, LLC v. Travel Caddy, Inc. 113 involved a patent on a very
straightforward device - a bag used to store and carry tools such as used
by an electrician. In this case, a three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit
could not agree on the construction of the term "between." 114

E.

Doctrine ofEquivalents:

Infringement under the Doctrine of Equivalents (DOE) continues to
be very difficult to prove. After Festo 115 limited application of the DOE
to amended claims only in cases of unforeseeability, tangentiality, or
failings of language, the court has shown repeatedly how these can bar a

107. Cardiac Pacemakers v. St. Jude Med., Inc., No. 2007-1296, No. 2007-1347, 2008 U.S.
App. LEXIS 25475 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 18, 2008).
108. Cardiac Pacemakers v. St. Jude Med., Inc., No. 2007-1296, No. 2007-1347, 2009 U.S.
App. LEXIS 4379 (Fed. Cir. March 6, 2009).
109. Brief of Amici Curiae Fed. Circuit Bar Ass'n & Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n in
Support of Cross-Appellants' Petition For Rehearing En Bane, Cardiac Pacemakers v. St. Jude
Med., Inc., 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4379 (Fed. Cir. March 6, 2009) (No. 2007-1296, No. 20071347), available at http://www.patentlyo.com/fcba-aipla-amicus-brief.pdf.
II 0. Brief for Amici Curiae Cisco Systems, Inc., Intel Corp., Apple Inc., Oracle Corp.,
Microsoft Corp., and Symantec Corp., in Suport of Cross-Appellants' Petition For Rehearing En
Bane, Cardiac Pacemakers v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4379 (Fed. Cir. March 6,
2009) (No. 2007-1296, No. 2007-1347), available at http://www.patentlyo.com/cardiac-amicusbrief-O l-30-09.pdf.
Ill. Cardiac Pacemakers, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4379, at *2.
112. Audio of Oral Argument, Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4379 (No.
2007 -1296-2) available at http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/mp3/2007-l296-2.mp3.
113. Outside the Box Innovations, LLC v. Travel Caddy, Inc., No. 2007-1253, 2008 U.S. App.
LEXIS 813, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 15, 2008).
114. Outside the Box Innovations, UC, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 813, at *10-ll.
115. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ud., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
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finding of infringement. 116 In Honeywell Int 'I, Inc. v. Hamilton
Sundstrand Corp., 111 the patentee argued that the accused infringer's
equivalent was not foreseeable. 118 The court disagreed, stating that
"[f]oreseeability does not require that the accused infringing product or
process be foreseeable, nor that any equivalents exist at the time; rather,
foreseeability only requires that one of ordinary skill in the art would
have reasonably foreseen the proposed equivalent at the pertinent
time." 119

F.

Willful Infringement/Inducement to Infringe:

In Seagate, 120 the Federal Circuit made it more difficult to establish
willful infringement and obtain enhanced damages by removing the
"affirmative duty of due care." 121 In Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm
Inc., 122 the defendant argued that it could not be liable for inducement to
infringe if it was not liable for willfulness under the Seagate standard. 123
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, holding the inducement
standard had not changed and that inducement does not require a finding
of willfulness. 124 Further, in finding the requisite intent for inducement
(that the defendant "knew or should have known" that its action would
cause direct infringement), the court held that advice of counsel (or
failure to procure this advice) was relevant to the inducement inquiry. 125
V. PATENT ENFORCEMENT ISSUES: DEFENSES

A.

Inequitable Conduct:

This year saw the return of inequitable conduct, along with a
heightened standard to keep it at bay. In Aventis Pharma S.A. v.
Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc./ 26 a patent was held to be
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. 127 The behavior in question

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

!d. at 740.
Honeywelllnt'l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 523 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
/d. at 1311.
/d. at 1314.
In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en bane).
/d. at 1371.
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id at 699.
Id
Id
Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 525 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
!d. at 1337.
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was the failure to include material information in a declaration submitted
to the Patent Office, but the intent of the patentee to deceive the Patent
Office was shown only circumstantially at best. 128 Judge Rader, in
dissent, suggested the court take a closer look at the intent necessary to
find inequitable conduct, noting that "inequitable conduct has taken on a
new life as a litigation tactic" and that it should be limited to "only the
most extreme cases of fraud and deception." 129 A petition for writ of
certiorari at the Supreme Court has recently been filed by the patentee. 130
The Federal Circuit followed up Aventis with Star Scientific, Inc. v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, Co. 131 In this case, the Federal Circuit stated
that:
Just as it is inequitable to permit a patentee who obtained his
patent through deliberate misrepresentations or omissions of
material information to enforce the patent against others, it is
also inequitable to strike down an entire patent where the
patentee only committed minor missteps or acted with minimal
culpability or in good faith. 132
The court thus required the infringer to prove the prongs of
materiality and deceptive intent with clear and convincing evidence and
noted that "inferences drawn from lesser evidence" will not satisfy the
requirements. 133
B.

Patent Exhaustion:

Following 2007, a year that saw a great number of Supreme Court
cases in patent law, the primary Supreme Court patent case is Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. 134 LG owned patents relating to
method and system claims. 135 LG licensed these patents to Intel,
granting Intel the right to make, use, and sell products covered by the
patent; however, the license included a limitation that no license was
granted to third-parties to combine licensed technology with non-Intel
equipment. 136 Intel also agreed to tell its customers that they had no

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id at 1342.
ld. at 1349 (Rader, J., dissenting).
Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Phann. Inc, 525 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
!d. at 1366.
Id
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 2109 (2008).
Id at 2113.
Id at 2ll4.
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license to combine the Intel products with any other non-Intel parts. 137
Quanta, a third-party, had purchased Intel's chips and combined them
with other technology. LG sued Quanta for patent infringement. 138
The District Court held that the license agreement between LG and
Intel exhausted the patent right and there was no infringement. 139 The
Federal Circuit reversed on two grounds: first, method claims could not
be exhausted, and second, the license was conditional, and therefore, not
exhausted. 140 The Supreme Court heard the case and ultimately
determined that the patents were indeed exhausted and Quanta did not
infringe. 141
The Supreme Court's reasoning is as follows: the basic principle of
patent exhaustion is that an authorized sale of a patented item ends any
patent rights with respect to that item. 142 In fact, any item that
"sufficiently embodies the patent - even if it does not completely
practice the patent - such that its only and intended use is to be fmished
under the terms of the patent" will invoke patent exhaustion. 143 The
Court next reasoned that patent exhaustion can apply to method claims,
although sale of a patented product is not necessarily a sale of a
method. 144
Applying this reasoning to Quanta, the Court concluded that Intel's
parts were capable of use only in practicing LG's patents, and the
relevant consideration is whether the products embody the patent's
essential features. 145 The Court then determined that the products sold
by Intel were licensed, but that this license did not restrict use of the
products by Intel - the first license was thus unconditional. 146 Intel was
licensed to make the products, and Intel was licensed to sell the products
to Quanta. 147 Any further restrictions on Quanta (or any other third
party) were not relevant to the inquiry of exhaustion. 148
So what is important about this case? Patent exhaustion can apply
to method claims as well as apparatus claims. Additionally, patent

137.
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139.
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exhaustion can be avoided by careful license drafting. The conditions
and limitations must apply to the licensee, not to a third party, as was the
case here. 149
C.

Erroneous Revival:

In Aristocrat Technologies Australia v. IGT, the Federal Circuit
held that improper revival of a patent application was not a defense to
patent infringement. 150 The Patent Office did not have the authority to
revive a national stage application that was unintentionally filed late, but
it did revive the application and issue a patent based thereon. 151 When
the resulting patent was then asserted in litigation, the accused infringer
argued the Patent Office's improper revival constituted a defense of
invalidity. 152 The Federal Circuit, looking to §282, held there was no
such defense. 153 This section of the Patent Act allows for the following
defenses to allegations of patent infringement: non-infringement,
invalidity based on conditions of patentability (defined by the court as
utility, novelty, and non-obviousness), invalidity based on failure to
comply with sections 112 or 251, or any other fact or act made a defense
by the act. 154 Thus, there is no recourse for an accused infringer to
invalidate a patent based on procedural lapses by the Patent Office. 155

VI. PATENT ENFORCEMENT ISSUES: REMEDIES

A.

Injunctions:

In 2008, we also got a better idea of how the Federal Circuit is
going to apply the four-factor test for injunctive relief that the Supreme
Court required in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. 156 For example,
consider Voda v. Cordis Corp. 157 In this case, a jury found Cordis liable
for patent infringement and awarded damages, but the district court
denied entry of a permanent injunction. 158 On appeal to the Federal
149. See id.
150. Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int'l Game Tech., 543 F.Jd 657 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
151. /d. at 660.
152. /d. at 662.
153. !d. at 663.
154. 35 u.s.c. § 112 (2007); 35 u.s.c. §251 (2007).
155. See, e.g., Magnivision, Inc. v. Bonneau Co., 115 F.3d 956, 960 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
("Procedural lapses during examination, should they occur, do not provide grounds of invalidity.").
156. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388,391 (2006).
157. Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
158. Id at 1315.
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Circuit, the court affirmed the denial of injunction because the patent
owner had exclusively licensed the patent to a third party. 159 Since the
patent owner himself was not irreparably injured (even if the exclusive
licensee may be), the court held that damages were sufficient to make
the patentee whole. 160
Licensing by the patentee, however, is not fatal. In Acumed LLC v.
Stryker Corp., 161 the court upheld the entry of a permanent injunction,
despite the fact that the patentee had previously licensed the patent to
other manufacturers. 162 The District Court had found that these prior
licenses did not defeat the requirement of irreparable harm because the
previous licensees were not direct competitors. 163 The Federal Circuit
noted that the "plaintiff's past willingness to license its patent is not
sufficient per se to establish lack of irreparable harm if a new infringer
were licensed." 164
One of the main questions after eBay165 was how non-practicing
patent-holding entities (NPEs) would be treated. In Broadcom v.
Qualcomm, the court provided some insight. 166 In this case, Broadcom
was a quasi-NPE, in that it was not making or selling the invention
claimed in the asserted patents; it was, however, a competitor of
Qualcomm based on an alternative chipset. 167 This permitted the court
to find irreparable harm. 168 Also interesting, is how the district court
crafted the injunction to suit both the patentee and the public interest. 169
The injunction order contained a sunset provision that allowed
Qualcomm to continue infringing for twenty months while paying a
compulsory license, after which time it must cease infringing
altogether. 170 This, the court reasoned, would allow Qualcomm to
redesign and retool without interrupting service to its customers. 171 It is
not clear, however, how the courts will treat NPE's that do not compete
on some level, such as patent holding companies or "patent trolls."

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

!d.
!d. at 1329.
Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
!d. at 1332.
!d. at 1328.
!d.
547 u.s. 388 (2006).
See Broadcom Corp. v. Qua1comm Inc., 543 F.3d 683 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
See id. at 702.
See id. at 703.
See id. at 701.
See id.
See id.
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Damages:

Damages are likely to be a hot issue in 2009, both in the courts and
in the legislature. Congress is contemplating damage apportionment as
part of patent reform, and the courts are seeing the issue turn political as
well. 172 In particular, keep an eye on Lucent Technologies, Inc. v.
Gateway, Inc., on appeal at the Federal Circuit, with the argument
expected to be scheduled either late spring or early summer. 173 In that
case, some $500 million in damages were awarded, even though only a
portion of the accused device was infringing. 174 This case has turned
into a prime exhibit in the Congressional debate about damages. 175 In
any case, expect at least a lively debate about damages, if not wholesale
change, in the coming year.
VII. PATENT REFORM LEGISLATION
Without a crystal ball, it is difficult to see what will happen with
patent reform legislation in the new year. Certainly, a number of people
are hopeful that the new administration will push forward, particularly
given President Obama's Technology Agenda that calls for reforming
the patent system to improve patent quality, and reduce uncertainty and
waste. 176 However, during a time when there are certainly more pressing
needs, patent reform may need to take a back seat for a while. Some hot
(and controversial) issues in patent reform include legislation to exempt
infringement of tax strategy patents by tax practitioners (similar to the
medical treatment exception), damages apportionment, and expanded
interlocutory appeals of claim construction rulings. 177 Other less
controversial measures include harmonizing procedures, such as first-to172. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform 2009: Damages, Patent Reform Contemplation,
PATENTLYO, March 3, 2009, http://www.patentlyo.cornlpatent/2009/03/patent-reform-2009damages.html.
173. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 543 F.3d 710 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
174. !d.
175. See, e.g., Manzullo & Michaud: New Patent Bill Encourages IP theft, Destroys American
Jobs, http://manzullo.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentiD= 113152 (last visited
April 3, 2009) (US Representative Don Manzullo, commenting that the patent reform bill would
weaken IP protections by limiting damage awards in patent infringement cases); See also, Rick
Merritt, Damages key to patent reform debate, EE TIMES, March 3, 2009, http://www.eetimes.cornl
news/latest/showArticle.jhtml?articleiD=215800319 (commenting on the patent reform bill, the
debate on damages, the possibility of giving judges more latitude to instruct juries on how to reach a
damages settlement, and bringing the United States to a first-to-file system).
176. White House, The Technology Agenda, Improve America's Competitiveness,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/technology (last visited April3, 2009).
177. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform Act 2009, PATENTLYO, March 3, 2009,
http://www.patentlyo.cornlpatent/2009/03/patent-reform-act-of-2009.htrnl.
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file and post-grant oppositions. 178 Patent reform legislation has been
introduced to the current Congress, and hearings have been held on the
controversial issue of damage apportionment. 179 It is possible that patent
law is in for great changes in 2009. 180

178. /d.
179. See, e.g., Donald Zuhn, Senate Judiciary Committee Holds Hearing on Patent Reform,
PATENTDOCS, March 10, 2009, http://www.patentdocs.org/2009/03/senate-judiciary-committeeholds-hearing-on-patent-refonn.htrnl (referring to testimony heard on the proposed patent reform).
180. See, e.g., Kevin Noonan, Senate "Patent Reform" Bill (S. 515) Voted out of Judiciary
Committee, PATENTDOCS, April 2, 2009, http://www.patentdocs.org/2009/04/senate-patent-refonnbill-s-515-voted-out-of-judiciary-committee.html (Bill S. 515 was voted out of the Senate Judiciary
Committee on April 2, 2009, albeit around much controversy and dissention).

